THRIVING after the FALL
Book Three GOVERNING after the FALL

GOVERNING · Part II · The Captured Lottery

The numbers and sources

Chapter 8: Who Says Organisation

The chapter tells its story with a handful of figures. Here is everything behind it: each figure with its study, its research document and its row in the log, the capture test and the scale ledger in full, the case for and the case against, where the sources disagree, and what is still open.

  • 71 open
  • 23 to check first

Read about the chapter · Its 71 rows in the log

Numbers to carry

The figures the chapter is built on, each with its research document and its row in the log.

  1. Twenty-five years: the line at which an intentional community counts as having lasted, with nine of thirty American communes of 1780 to 1860 crossing it. Kanter 1972, Commitment and Community, as CA-09 gives it. MO-08 gives a different split. This chapter owns the number. C08-33.
  2. Over three times: how much likelier a secular commune was to dissolve in any year than a religious one. Sosis 2000, 200 communes from 1663 to 1937, odds ratio 0.315, as MO-08 gives it from a secondary copy. C08-36.
  3. A third of headships, and more water: West Bengal's reservation of village council headships for women, and what followed where a woman held the post (women's attendance at the village assembly from 6.9 to 9.9 per cent, drinking water investment up 60 per cent). Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004, Econometrica. CA-05. C08-29, C08-30.
  4. A fifth come, two to five per cent propose: average attendance at Vermont town meetings of 20.5 per cent (Bryan 2004, 1,435 meetings in 210 towns), and the share of Athenian citizens who ever proposed a motion (Hansen 1991). PS-07. C08-64, C08-65.
  5. 1911: Michels, Political Parties, from inside the German Social Democrats. The Preface owns the row as P-32. CA-03. C08-06.

Every figure

One row for each figure or finding the chapter rests on. Status is how the finding stands in the research: robust, contested, open or fallen. It is not yet the log's verdict.

FigureWhat it measuresSource (authors, year, venue, N, or the record and its date)DocumentRowKindStatus
A church hall past one in the morningopening scene, a compositebuilt on Polletta 2002 and the time cost of meetingsCA-04, PS-07C08-01designopen
Two in the morningwho decides by consensusPolletta 2002, Freedom Is an Endless MeetingCA-04C08-03inferredrobust
1911, Political PartiesMichels' book and maximMichels 1911, from the SPDCA-03, PS-07C08-06, P-32recordrobust
A salaried staff of officials and editorsSPD apparatusMichels as CA-03 gives it, thousands of paid functionariesCA-03C08-07recordrobust
Weimar, and 1975the narrator's anchornarrator's biography, general knowledgenoneC08-09, C08-10saidopen
1921Bolshevik ban on factionsTenth Party Congress, March 1921CA-03C08-11recordrobust
1956, Union Democracythe printers' union as the exceptionLipset, Trow and Coleman 1956CA-03C08-12recordrobust
Four supports of the ITUtwo parties, literacy, outside clubs, small pay gapLipset, Trow and Coleman 1956CA-03C08-14inferredrobust
Northern California localsthe iron law broken from aboveVoss and Sherman 2000, 50 localsCA-03C08-16inferredcontested
1970, 1972, Beulah, MississippiFreeman's talk and essayFreeman as Joreen, Berkeley Journal of Sociology 1972CA-03, CA-04C08-17recordrobust
Mid-1970sfragmentation of structureless groupsFreeman as CA-04 gives itCA-04C08-23recordopen
Three kinds of capturethe persistent, the articulate, the manipulativeCA-04CA-04C08-25inferredopen
1971, August 2023, 2024Christiania's founding, the shooting, the vote and the cobblesMO-08 notes [53] to [57]MO-08C08-26recordopen
2003, The Logic of Political Survivalselectorate theoryBueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson and Morrow 2003CA-05C08-27inferredcontested
A third, the 1990sheadships reserved for women in West BengalChattopadhyay and Duflo 2004, EconometricaCA-05C08-29recordcontested, year 1998 or 1994
More women at the assembly, more spent on watereffect of reservationChattopadhyay and Duflo 2004, 6.9 to 9.9 per cent, plus 60 per centCA-05C08-30recordrobust
1268 to 1271, 1274the Viterbo vacancy and Ubi periculumFandom and WikipediaCA-05C08-31recordopen, weak sourcing
1972, 1780 to 1860, twenty-five years, nine of thirtyKanter's line and success rateKanter 1972, Harvard UP, sample of 30 from 91CA-09, MO-08C08-33recordcontested
A few yearslife of the failed communesKanter, under four years on averageCA-09C08-35recordopen
Over three timessecular against religious dissolutionSosis 2000, 200 communes, 3,129 commune-years, odds ratio 0.315MO-08, CA-09C08-36recordcontested, second-hand
Costly demands help only religious communesconstraint effectSosis and Bressler 2003, Cross-Cultural Research, 83 communesMO-08C08-37recordcontested, table mismatch
A dozen years, nearly all gone1970s communesZablocki 1980, over 90 per cent dissolved by follow-upMO-08, CA-09C08-38recordcontested, sample 60 or 120
1920, 1935, the 1960sBruderhof founding, founder's death, purgesencyclopedia.com and advocacy newsletters, MO-08 uncitedMO-08, CA-09C08-45, C08-46recordopen, weak sourcing
More than nine hundred, 1978deaths at JonestownAPA Monitor (912) against "over 900"CA-03, CA-09C08-47recordcontested
1974, 1986the Democratic Workers Party, founding and expulsion of its founderWikipedia and cultencyclopediaCA-09C08-48, C08-49recordopen, weak sourcing
1967, about a hundredTwin Oaks founding and sizetwinoaks.org, Kinkade 1994MO-08C08-50recordopen
2013Damanhur founder's death, the federation heldMO-08 note [38]MO-08C08-52recordopen
2005oligarchy as unaccountable powerLeach 2005CA-03C08-59inferredcontested
About a fifthVermont town meeting attendanceBryan 2004, Real Democracy, 1,435 meetings, 20.5 per centPS-07C08-64recordrobust
Two to five per centAthenians who ever proposed a motionHansen 1991, an estimatePS-07C08-65inferredopen
Three hundredthe village rungbook's designnoneC08-66designrobust
An hour or two a week, an evening a monththe time the arrangement needsdesignCA-03, CA-04, PS-07C08-71designopen

The capture test

  • Iron law. Captor: the salaried official. First move: control the treasury, the press and the membership lists. What resisted: in the ITU an organised opposition, literate members, an outside social life and a small pay gap. Historical case: the Bolshevik general secretariat after the 1921 faction ban. Documents CA-03, PS-07.
  • Structurelessness. Captor: the persistent, the articulate, the manipulative. First move: stay, draft, befriend, and deny being an elite. What resisted: formal structure, according to Freeman. Historical cases: the women's movement groups of the 1970s, Occupy (ended by police eviction), Christiania (ended by dropping consensus and calling the police after a shooting in 2023). Documents CA-04, MO-08.
  • Selectorate. Captor: a ruler with a small dependent coalition. First move: inflate the nominal selectorate, purge independents, pay the few privately. What resisted: widening the coalition, by reserved seats in West Bengal and by locking in the cardinals with a supermajority rule. Documents CA-05.
  • Charismatic commune. Captor: the founder, then the heir. First move: raise the cost of leaving, through surrendered property, cut ties and isolation. What resisted: members' collective action in the DWP in 1986, collegial elder councils and reconciliation in the Bruderhof, a written constitution in Damanhur, petition and secret ballot in Twin Oaks. What did not: Jonestown, where the move to Guyana removed exit altogether. Documents CA-05, CA-09, MO-08. CA-09's own first failure for a village is a manufactured crisis used to demand emergency power.

The scale ledger

ArrangementHouseholdHamletVillageDistrictWatershedRegionNationPlanetDocument
Party or union organisation under the iron lawnot applicableoligarchy appearsoligarchy appearsoligarchy appearsoligarchy appearsoligarchy appearsparties oligarchic, CA-03's "100%" unsourcednot statedCA-03
Two-party union, the ITUnot applicablenot statednot statedworked, two parties, clubs, auditors in CA-03's designworked for decadesnot statederoded with the tradenever triedCA-03
Informal, structureless groupworkedcaptured, cliques and schismscult scale capturefailednever triednever triednever triednever triedCA-03, CA-04
Full consensus assembly, Christianiaworkedworked, area meetingsworked with severe frictionfailed, gang capturenever triednever triednever triednever triedMO-08
Small winning coalitionnot applicablenot statedshadow body of wealthy families as first failuredual-key ledgers, recallable delegates proposednot statednot statedworst rule where the coalition is smallnot statedCA-05
Reserved headships, West Bengalnot applicablenot applicableworked, more women at the assembly, more spent on waternot statednot statedneeded a statenot statednot statedCA-05
Costly commitment, religious communeworkedworkedworked, nine of thirty past twenty-five yearsworked by federation, Hutterites and Bruderhofworked by federationnever triednever triednever triedCA-09, MO-08
Secular commune with written structure, Twin Oaksworkedworkedworked at about a hundrednever triednever triednever triednever triednever triedMO-08
Founder-led party commune, DWPnot statedcapturedcaptured until the members expelled the foundernever triednever triednever triednever triednever triedCA-09

The case for and the case against

The case the chapter makes

  • Lasting organisations drift towards rule by those who run them: Michels 1911, Panebianco 1988 (CA-03, PS-07).
  • The drift can be held off by an opposition, literacy, an outside social life and an office not worth clinging to: Lipset, Trow and Coleman 1956 (CA-03).
  • Unwritten structure is captured faster than written structure: Freeman 1972, Polletta 2002, Mansbridge 1980 on Helpline (CA-04, PS-07).
  • The size of the winning coalition predicts how much is spent on everyone: Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004 (CA-05).
  • Communes that lasted demanded costly commitment, and founders are the main capture risk: Kanter 1972, Sosis 2000, Sosis and Bressler 2003, Zablocki 1980, Weber 1922, Lifton 1961, Lalich 2004 (CA-09, MO-08).

The case against

  • The iron law is only a tendency, oligarchy means unaccountable power, and Michels overstated: Leach 2005, Voss and Sherman 2000, Shaw and Hill 2014 on 683 wikis (CA-03).
  • The exceptions were temporary or rescued from above, and participatory bodies decay once their sponsor goes: Porto Alegre after 2004, Chicago's school councils (PS-07).
  • Selectorate theory is a blunt instrument, its coalition measure is not independent of democracy indices, and it ignores ideology and informal power: Clarke and Stone 2008, Gallagher and Hanson 2015, Kennedy 2009 (CA-05).
  • Most people approached by high-demand groups do not join, and the cult model overstates control: Barker 1984, Kent, and Popper on utopian engineering (CA-09).
  • Face to face unitary meetings can silence the weak, and the secret ballot protects minorities: Mansbridge 1980 (CA-04).

Where the sources disagree

  • Kanter's sample: CA-09 gives 9 of 30 succeeding at 25 years from 91 communities. MO-08 gives 30 successful (33 years or more) against 61 unsuccessful (under 16). The chapter follows CA-09 and owns the 25-year line.
  • Sosis's datasets: MO-08 gives 200 communes to Sosis 2000 and 83 to Sosis and Bressler 2003, but its table puts the odds ratios 0.315 and 3.174 on the 83-commune sample. CA-09 credits the 200 communes to 2003.
  • Zablocki: MO-08 gives 120 communes, CA-09 gives 60 communes and 804 people. A 1980 book is given waves to 1986.
  • Jonestown: 912 dead (CA-03) against "over 900" (CA-09). The chapter says more than nine hundred.
  • West Bengal reservation: CA-05 dates it to a 1998 amendment, CA-11 places the constitutional amendment in 1994. The chapter says the 1990s.
  • Bruderhof purges: dozens in the 1960s and 1970s (MO-08) against hundreds in the late 1950s and 1960s (CA-09). The chapter says many, in the 1960s.
  • The knot: CA-09 calls low exit cost "the only structurally sound defense" against capture, while its own Kanter and Sosis findings show the long-lived communes raised the cost of leaving. The chapter states both and does not resolve them.
  • Secret ballot: PS-03 calls it the only verified defence against intimidation, PS-06 recommends public hands, PS-07 quotes Bryan that the paper ballot slowly kills town meeting. The chapter keeps it for decisions about persons only.
  • Kibbutz founding: 1909 (CA-03) against 1910 (CA-05, MO-08). Not in the prose.
  • Twin Oaks quota: 42 hours (MO-08 body) against 40 (MO-08 later). Not in the prose.
  • Auroville: the Supreme Court stay of 14 December 2023 upheld the Governing Board, which CA-09's summary misreads as a reversal. Left out.

Open questions

  • Weak or second-hand sourcing: Sosis 2000 via a matchism.org PDF (C08-36), Kanter via a ResearchGate secondary article and a Scribd copy (C08-33, C08-34), Zablocki via twinoaks.org and course pages (C08-38), the DWP via Wikipedia and cultencyclopedia (C08-48, C08-49), Viterbo via Fandom and Wikipedia (C08-31), the German Greens via an anarchist blog (C08-54), the Bruderhof via advocacy newsletters or no citation (C08-45, C08-46), Christiania's notes not checked (C08-26), Michels via Wikipedia and Academia (C08-04).
  • CA-04 cites Freeman's essay through a paper on the World Social Forum, not the essay itself (C08-17).
  • How long control changed hands in the ITU needs Union Democracy itself (C08-13).
  • What moved the DWP's members to expel their founder in 1986 is not in the documents (C08-49).
  • Does a written structure substitute for costly commitment in secular communes, or is Twin Oaks a lucky case? No document tests it (C08-51).
  • CA-09's open question: can a costly signal be required without raising the cost of exit to the point of capture? Its village design proposes a "non-lethal costly signal" without saying what limits it.
  • The opening scene is a composite, not a recorded meeting (C08-01).

The documents

Research documents, primary first:

  • CA-03 Michels' iron law of oligarchy and its tests
  • CA-04 The tyranny of structurelessness: how consensus gets captured
  • CA-05 Selectorate theory: the dictator's handbook applied to villages, firms and churches
  • CA-09 Charismatic capture: cults, communes and the founder's shadow
  • MO-08 Intentional communities: who survives 25 years, and who survives the founder
  • PS-07 Who shows up: the participation problem
  • PS-03 Wisdom and madness of crowds: when to deliberate and when to count (consulted)
  • PS-06 Ritual, religion and the scaling of cooperation (consulted)
  • CA-11 (consulted for the date of the Indian amendment)

Primary works the documents name:

  • Robert Michels, 1911, Political Parties
  • Seymour Martin Lipset, Martin Trow and James Coleman, 1956, Union Democracy
  • Kim Voss and Rachel Sherman, 2000, "Breaking the Iron Law of Oligarchy"
  • Darcy Leach, 2005, "The Iron Law of What Again?", Sociological Theory
  • Angelo Panebianco, 1988, Political Parties: Organization and Power
  • Jo Freeman (Joreen), 1972, "The Tyranny of Structurelessness", Berkeley Journal of Sociology
  • Francesca Polletta, 2002, Freedom Is an Endless Meeting
  • Jane Mansbridge, 1980, Beyond Adversary Democracy
  • Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph Siverson and James Morrow, 2003, The Logic of Political Survival
  • Raghabendra Chattopadhyay and Esther Duflo, 2004, "Women as Policy Makers", Econometrica
  • Kevin Clarke and Randall Stone, 2008, American Political Science Review
  • Mary Gallagher and Jonathan Hanson, 2015, Annual Review of Political Science
  • Rosabeth Moss Kanter, 1972, Commitment and Community
  • Richard Sosis, 2000, on religion and cooperation in utopian communities, and Richard Sosis and Eric Bressler, 2003, Cross-Cultural Research
  • Benjamin Zablocki, 1980, Alienation and Charisma
  • Max Weber, 1922, on the routinisation of charisma
  • Robert Jay Lifton, 1961, Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism
  • Janja Lalich, 2004, Bounded Choice
  • Eileen Barker, 1984, The Making of a Moonie
  • Kat Kinkade, 1994, Is It Utopia Yet?
  • Frank Bryan, 2004, Real Democracy
  • Mogens Herman Hansen, 1991, The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes

Its documents in the Library

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