GOVERNING · Part II · The Captured Lottery
The numbers and sources
Chapter 7: The Captured Lottery
The chapter tells its story with a handful of figures. Here is everything behind it: each figure with its study, its research document and its row in the log, the capture test and the scale ledger in full, the case for and the case against, where the sources disagree, and what is still open.
- 72 open
- 20 to check first
Numbers to carry
The figures the chapter is built on, each with its research document and its row in the log.
- 1297 to 1323: the Serrata, the closing of Venice's Great Council to families who had sat in it before (HI-03, with Puga and Trefler 2014, QJE 129(2), SY-01 for the four generations). Chapter text: "settled in 1297", "Between 1297 and 1323 the council closed". Rows C07-34 and C07-35.
- 697 to 1797: the span of the Venetian republic, about 1,100 years, with no doge making himself a prince (HI-03). Chapter text: "roughly a thousand years", as in the Preface (P-37). NA-02's narrower claim of 529 years without internal capture of the dogeship rests on one paper. Row C07-33.
- About 5,000 men eligible by guild in a Florence of 50,000 to 70,000 in the early fifteenth century, feeding a Signoria drawn every two months (HI-04). Chapter text: "tens of thousands", "about five thousand", "two months". Rows C07-02 and C07-09.
- Six months or one year: the podestà's term, followed by a sindacato of five to fifteen days in which any resident could complain and be paid from his bond (HI-06). Chapter text: "six months, or a year". This is not the Roman dictator's six months, which is chapter 6's row. Rows C07-43 and C07-45.
- About 100 families held real power in Venice and over 95 per cent of Venetians were disenfranchised (SY-02, after Finlay 1981, single compiler). Chapter text: "about a hundred families", "more than nine in ten". Row C07-62.
Every figure
One row for each figure or finding the chapter rests on. Status is how the finding stands in the research: robust, contested, open or fallen. It is not yet the log's verdict.
| Figure | What it measures | Source (authors, year, venue, N, or the record and its date) | Document | Row | Kind | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Leather purses, parchment tickets | how names were stored for the draw | the imborsazione, Florence | HI-04 | C07-01 | record | robust |
| Two months | the term of the Signoria and the interval between draws | Florentine statutes as HI-04 gives them, Signoria of nine, 54 people a year | HI-04 | C07-02, C07-11 | record | robust |
| Three bars on a drawn name | absence, a close relative recently in office, tax arrears | the divieti, allo specchio | HI-04 | C07-03 | record | robust |
| After 1434, priors chosen by hand | the Medici mechanism | Rubinstein, The Government of Florence under the Medici (1434 to 1494), accoppiatori a mano | HI-04, ME-01, SY-02 | C07-05 | inferred | robust |
| About a century | how long Florence drew from purses before the Medici | 1328 to 1434, inferred from HI-04's dates | HI-04 | C07-06 | inferred | robust |
| 1328 to 1512 | the guild republic | HI-04 | HI-04 | C07-07 | record | robust |
| Tens of thousands | Florence's population | 50,000 to 70,000 early fifteenth century (HI-04), over 100,000 by 1300 (HI-06, from a children's encyclopaedia), 60,000 to 90,000 (SY-09) | HI-04, HI-06, SY-09 | C07-09 | record | contested |
| About five thousand | men eligible by guild status | HI-04. SY-09 gives a pool of 2,000 to 4,000 | HI-04, SY-09 | C07-09 | record | contested |
| Two thirds | the share of black and white beans needed in the scrutiny | the squittinio | HI-04 | C07-10 | record | robust |
| 1343 to 1434 | the years of repeated Balìa purges | Tratte volumes, Archivio di Stato di Firenze | HI-04 | C07-13 | record | robust |
| A small circle of families | consensus oligarchy | Najemy 1982, Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics, 1280 to 1400. HI-04 also speaks of the top fifty families | HI-04 | C07-14 | inferred | robust |
| 1378, 1382, 1434 | the Ciompi, the purge, the end of the Albizzi | HI-04 | HI-04 | C07-15 | record | robust |
| 1465 and 1466 | the return of blind drawing and the move upstream to the scrutiny | Rubinstein as HI-04 gives him | HI-04 | C07-18 | inferred | robust |
| Assessed into arrears | the tax bar as a tool of capture | Catasto and estimi used against the Strozzi, Cosimo paying clients' arrears | HI-04, SY-09 | C07-19 | inferred | open |
| 1494, 1512 | the Medici's flight and return | Charles VIII, Spanish troops | HI-04 | C07-20, C07-22 | record | robust |
| 1268 | the doge election told in the chapter | HI-03 from a German tourist site and Reddit, ME-01 | HI-03, ME-01 | C07-23 | record | open |
| Forty-one | the final electors of the doge | ten stages ending in 25 of 41 (HI-03, SY-07), eleven stages (SY-09) | HI-03, SY-07, SY-09 | C07-24 | record | contested |
| A year or more | the contumacia, the cooling-off before the same office | one to five years, Brill as HI-03 cites it | HI-03 | C07-28 | record | robust |
| 1310 | the conspiracy and the Council of Ten | 15 June 1310 for the plot (HI-03). The Ten founded 10 July 1310 (CA-02) or made permanent 1339 (HI-03, Wikipedia) | HI-03, CA-02 | C07-29, C07-30 | record | contested |
| A month | the term of each of the Ten's three heads | HI-03 | HI-03 | C07-30 | record | open |
| 1355 | the doge's plot and execution | Marin Falier, HI-03, SY-01, SY-09 | HI-03 | C07-31 | record | robust |
| 1457 | a doge forced to abdicate by the Ten | Foscari | HI-03 | C07-32 | record | robust |
| Roughly a thousand years | Venice's span against any one man | 697 to 1797 (HI-03). Preface P-37 | HI-03 | C07-33 | record | robust |
| Tenth century, and the decades before 1297 | new families entering Venetian power | Puga and Trefler 2014, QJE 129(2): 273 endorsers in 960, 971 and 982, 59 per cent new, and 50 new families taking 13 per cent of seats 1261 to 1296 | HI-03, SY-07 | C07-34 | inferred | robust |
| 1297 to 1323 | the Serrata | HI-03, SY-01, SY-02, SY-07 | HI-03 | C07-35 | record | robust |
| Grew large | size of the Great Council | about 60 to over 1,000, then 1,200 to 2,000 (HI-03, partly a Scribd thesis), 1,200 to 2,700 (SY-01), 1,500 to 2,500 (SY-09), about 480 in 1268 (NA-02) | HI-03 | C07-36 | record | contested |
| Marriage tracked wealth | closure of the nobility | Puga and Trefler 2014, 6,959 patrician marriages 1400 to 1599, correlation 0.74 | HI-03 | C07-37 | inferred | robust |
| 1387, 1539 | the law on unsigned denunciations, the State Inquisitors | HI-03 | HI-03 | C07-39 | record | open |
| 1191 | Manegoldo del Tettuccio of Brescia, first podestà of Genoa | HI-06, from Wikipedia | HI-06 | C07-40 | record | open |
| About a century | Genoa's consuls fighting one another before the podestà | consuls from about 1090, Genoa 1096, Greif 1994 and 2006 | HI-06 | C07-41 | record | robust |
| Six months, or a year | the podestà's term | HI-06 | HI-06 | C07-43 | record | robust |
| Some days | how long the podestà stayed for his audit | five to fifteen days | HI-06 | C07-45 | record | robust |
| August 1290 | the Bologna knife ban and the arrest under it | Blanshei 2010, cried at 204 sites, arrest by 19 August | HI-06 | C07-46 | record | robust |
| 1259 | the death of the lord who held both offices | Ezzelino III da Romano | HI-06 | C07-51 | record | robust |
| A small household | the podestà's force against the factions | a familia of about twenty against thousands of retainers | HI-06 | C07-52 | record | robust |
| 2001, 2007 | the encyclopaedia's launch and the peak of its active writers | Halfaker, Geiger, Morgan and Riedl 2013, The Rise and Decline of an Open Collaboration Community | CA-10 | C07-55 | record | robust |
| Many smaller wikis | the spread of oligarchy with growth | Shaw and Hill 2014, Laboratories of Oligarchy?, Journal of Communication, 1,837 of 5,216 wikis | CA-10 | C07-57 | inferred | robust |
| Tiny turnout | participation in token votes | 1.77 per cent across 4,936 votes | CA-10 | C07-58 | record | open |
| 1521 | Guicciardini's dialogue | Dialogo del reggimento di Firenze | HI-04 | C07-59 | said | robust |
| Most resilient design | Venice's ballot as one synthesis rates it | SY-01, doge stages from a blog | SY-01 | C07-61 | inferred | contested |
| About a hundred | families holding real power in Venice | Finlay 1981 as SY-02 gives him, single compiler | SY-02 | C07-62 | inferred | contested |
| More than nine in ten | Venetians with no say | over 95 per cent (SY-02, SY-09), over 90 per cent unsourced (HI-03) | SY-02, HI-03, SY-09 | C07-62 | inferred | contested |
| A single paper | the basis of the no internal capture claim | Lines 2007 via rangevoting.org, 529 years, model values blank in the PDF | NA-02 | C07-63 | inferred | open |
| A romantic myth | the free commune as one historian sees it | Philip Jones 1997, The Italian City-State | HI-06 | C07-65 | inferred | contested |
| 150 to 500, 1,500 to 5,000 | the village and the district | the book's rungs | none | C07-66 | design | robust |
| A year or two | the cooling-off proposed for a village | the chapter's own, after the contumacia | HI-03 | C07-68 | design | open |
| Six months | the term of a stranger borrowed between villages | the chapter's own, after the podestà | HI-06 | C07-70 | design | open |
| An evening a month | time for reading the roll aloud | the chapter's own guess | none | C07-71 | design | open |
The capture test
- The Florentine purse. The captor was the faction that could fill the square, from the Albizzi circle to Cosimo de' Medici. The first move was a Parlamento that named a Balìa, which named the accoppiatori, who held the bags. Then the draw stopped and the priors were chosen by hand, and when blind drawing came back the work moved to the scrutiny and the tax bar. What resisted was the city's pushback of 1465 and 1466 and, for eighteen years after 1494, a Great Council opened to a wider list. HI-04's own name for the first failure is the quiet, procedural capture of the eligibility list (HI-04, Rubinstein, Najemy 1982).
- The Venetian ballot. No single man captured the dogeship through the ballot (HI-03, NA-02, SY-01). The captor was the class already in the Great Council, and the first move was the Serrata of 1297, closing the list. What resisted personal capture was the alternation of lot and election, the promissione, the contumacia and the Council of Ten, and the Ten itself had to be curbed by the Great Council's purse. HI-03's village design names the first failure as dominant families threatening those chosen by lot.
- The podestà. The captor was the faction that took the council that hired him and the guild that supplied the syndics, or a lord who had himself elected to the office. The first move was to hire an ally and pack the audit. What resisted was the short term, the stranger's isolation and the bond, and a supermajority to hire. HI-06 names the first failure for a district as co-optation by the wealthiest local family (HI-06, Ezzelino III da Romano).
- The open systems of the chapter's own time. The captor was the cohort that arrived early, and the first move was rules and patrols that undid newcomers' work. In the token votes the list was weighted by holdings from the start. CA-10 names its own first failure as the patient outsider who earns a tired keeper's trust, its XZ Utils case, which the chapter does not tell (CA-10, Halfaker and colleagues 2013, Shaw and Hill 2014).
The scale ledger
Rungs: household 4 to 10, hamlet 30 to 50, village 150 to 500, district 1,500 to 5,000, watershed or town 15,000 to 50,000, region 0.5 to 5 million, nation a few million to 500 million, planet 8 billion. Blank means the reports give no verdict at that rung.
| Arrangement | Household | Hamlet | Village | District | Watershed | Region | Nation | Planet | Document |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Florentine lot with scrutiny | worked, in guild elections | worked, in the quartieri with a pool of about 5,000 | operated but highly vulnerable | failed, Pisa and Arezzo got no draws | never tried | never tried | HI-04 | ||
| Renaissance lot, Florence and Venice | worked | failed, hierarchical governors | ME-01 | ||||||
| Venetian multistage ballot | succeeded | succeeded | succeeded | HI-03 | |||||
| Venetian hereditary council | failed | failed | unstable | succeeded | succeeded | failed | HI-03 | ||
| Hired podestà with sindacato | fails | fails | rarely tried, fails | works marginally, as an arbitrator | optimal | fails, the Visconti | HI-06 | ||
| Open roll read aloud (proposal) | never tried | never tried | none | ||||||
| Stranger borrowed between villages (proposal) | never tried | none |
The case for and the case against
The case the chapter makes
- A lottery is only as fair as the list it draws from, and in Florence the list was where the fighting happened (HI-04, Najemy 1982, Rubinstein).
- The Medici held Florence through its own lot, first by choosing by hand and then by working the scrutiny and the tax bar (HI-04).
- Venice's ballot kept any one man from the dogeship for centuries (HI-03, NA-02, SY-01).
- Venice paid for that with the Serrata, a closed class, a cartel at sea and informers (HI-03, Puga and Trefler 2014, SY-02).
- A stranger on a short term, isolated and audited at exit, can judge between factions that trust nobody local (HI-06, Greif 1994 and 2006, Martín Romera 2021).
- Open bodies close by small steps, without anybody shutting the door (CA-10, Halfaker and colleagues 2013, Shaw and Hill 2014).
The case against
- The lot fills offices with mediocre men, and election lets a city find its ablest (Guicciardini 1521, as HI-04 gives him).
- Two-month terms destroyed the city's memory, and Rome's open quarrels were healthier than Florence's false consensus (Machiavelli 1520, as HI-04 gives him).
- Venice was an oligarchy of about a hundred families over a disenfranchised majority, a lottery for intra-oligarchic peace (SY-02 after Finlay 1981, SY-09).
- SY-01 rates Venice the most resilient anti-capture design while calling it an extractive oligarchy. That closure may be what made it last is the chapter's inference, not SY-01's.
- Venice's closure brought stagnation, cartelised trade and a culture of suspicion (HI-03, Puga and Trefler 2014, SY-09 after Finlay and Lane).
- The free commune is a romantic, anachronistic myth (Philip Jones 1997, as HI-06 gives him).
- The podestà was too weak against armed factions, and the communes fell to the signori anyway (HI-06).
Where the sources disagree
- The Council of Ten: established 10 July 1310 (CA-02) or made permanent in 1339 (HI-03, from Wikipedia). The chapter says it was built in response to 1310.
- The doge election: ten stages (HI-03, SY-07) or eleven (SY-09), from tourist sites, Reddit and a blog. The chapter gives the shape and the final forty-one and says the count varies.
- Falier's execution: HI-03 and SY-09 put it on the Giant's Staircase, which was built later. SY-01 says the steps of the palace. The chapter does not place it.
- The Bon affair: HI-03 has him corrupting the ballottino in a doge election, ME-01 has him fixing the balls for his own early entry. The chapter says only that a noble was said to be tried for trying to fix the balls.
- Dandolo's promissione: 1198 in HI-03, usually 1192. Not in the chapter.
- Florence's population: over 100,000 by 1300 (HI-06, from a children's encyclopaedia) against 50,000 to 70,000 in the early fifteenth century (HI-04) and 60,000 to 90,000 (SY-09). The Black Death falls between. The chapter says tens of thousands.
- Florence's eligible pool: about 5,000 (HI-04) against 2,000 to 4,000 (SY-09). The chapter says about five thousand.
- Venice's resilience: the most resilient anti-capture design and 1,100 years without coups (SY-01), against SY-01's own record of 1310 and 1355, against about a hundred families and over 95 per cent excluded (SY-02), and SY-09's low score with long life, which SY-09 itself calls a false negative. The chapter puts the admiring and the damning readings side by side.
- Venice without internal capture for 529 years rests on a single paper (NA-02, Lines 2007). The chapter says so in the case against.
- Rubinstein's book is dated 1966 (SY-02) and 1997 (HI-04), probably the first and second editions.
- The Medici tax weapon: HI-04 has rivals assessed into arrears (the Strozzi, timing to check), SY-09 has Cosimo paying his clients' arrears. The chapter gives both.
- The chapter's plan's gold and silver balls: the documents speak of golden balls (ME-01) or balls (HI-03). No document has silver. The chapter says balls.
Open questions
- C07-09: Florence's population across the Black Death, and the eligible pool, need the primary counts.
- C07-16, C07-20, C07-33 and C07-48: Cosimo as banker, the Alps, Napoleon and the career podestà are general knowledge, not in the documents.
- C07-19: when the Catasto was turned against the Strozzi.
- C07-23 to C07-27: the doge election, the St Barbara's Day lot, the Bon affair and the promissione need a scholarly source in place of tourist sites, Reddit and Wikipedia.
- C07-30: the founding date of the Council of Ten.
- C07-36: the size of the Great Council at each date.
- C07-40: Manegoldo del Tettuccio rests on Wikipedia.
- C07-44: the podestà's household from the Florentine statutes of 1288 rests on a personal website.
- C07-62: the hundred families is credited to Finlay 1981 but was not found in SY-02's body on a search, only in the summary of it.
- C07-63: Lines 2007 and the blank model values in NA-02's PDF.
- Whether an open roll read aloud resists capture at village scale has never been tested. The chapter offers it as a proposal.
- Whether a district can borrow an arbiter from one of its villages without the lending village gaining a hold over the others. The chapter's question, not the documents'.
- Whether an open body can keep its door open to newcomers once it needs rules against vandals. The chapter's question, drawn from CA-10's cases.
The documents
Research documents, primary first:
- HI-04 Florence and the captured lottery.
- HI-03 Venice: a thousand years without a tyrant, and what it cost.
- HI-06 The Italian communes and the podestà: hiring an outsider to rule for six months.
- ME-01 Sortition from the kleroterion to the permanent citizens' council.
- CA-10 Capture in open systems: Wikipedia, open source and the DAOs.
- SY-01 The case against democracy, taken seriously.
- SY-02 The case against sortition and deliberation.
- SY-07 Cross-cutting principles.
- SY-09 Capture-resistance scoring.
- NA-02 Collective animal decisions: democratic versus despotic, and the role of the uninformed.
- CA-02 Does power corrupt, or do the corrupt seek power?
- HI-11 Micro-republics that lasted: San Marino, Ragusa and the one-month rector.
- The Preface's verification row P-37.
Primary works the reports name:
- Nicolai Rubinstein, The Government of Florence under the Medici (1434 to 1494), 1966, second edition 1997.
- John M. Najemy, 1982, Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics, 1280 to 1400.
- John M. Najemy, 2006, A History of Florence 1200 to 1575.
- Francesco Guicciardini, 1521, Dialogo del reggimento di Firenze.
- Niccolò Machiavelli, 1520, Discourse on Florentine Affairs, and Istorie fiorentine.
- David Herlihy and Christiane Klapisch-Zuber on the 1427 Catasto, with John Padgett's coding.
- Diego Puga and Daniel Trefler, 2014, International Trade and Institutional Change: Medieval Venice's Response to Globalization, Quarterly Journal of Economics 129(2).
- Robert Finlay, Politics in Renaissance Venice, dated 1980 in HI-03 and 1981 in SY-02.
- Frederic C. Lane, 1973, Venice, a Maritime Republic.
- Gasparo Contarini, 1543, De magistratibus et republica Venetorum, and Donato Giannotti, 1526.
- Brian Pullan, 1971, and Andrea Zannini, 1993, on the cittadini.
- Toby Walsh and Lirong Xia, 2011, IJCAI, on the doge election.
- Chris Wickham, 2015, Sleepwalking into a New World, and Avner Greif, 1994 and 2006, on the communes.
- Sarah Rubin Blanshei, 2010, Politics and Justice in Late Medieval Bologna.
- Martín Romera, 2021, on the sindacato, as HI-06 cites it.
- Philip Jones, 1997, The Italian City-State.
- Brunetto Latini, Li Livres dou Tresor.
- Aaron Halfaker, R. Stuart Geiger, Jonathan Morgan and John Riedl, 2013, The Rise and Decline of an Open Collaboration Community.
- Aaron Shaw and Benjamin Mako Hill, 2014, Laboratories of Oligarchy?, Journal of Communication.
- Vitalik Buterin, 2021, Moving beyond coin voting governance.
- Lines, 2007, as NA-02 cites it.