THRIVING after the FALL

The Library · Document 305 · GOVERNING · Capture, the dark triad and failure modes

Money as the capture vector: lobbying, rents and elite capture at the village

Traces how wealth captures governance, from forager levelling (Woodburn 1982) through village elite capture to regulatory capture (Stigler 1971). In Indonesian poverty targeting, meetings run through local leaders drew 15% of households against 59% for full community meetings, and Mansuri and Rao (2013) find participatory aid widely captured. Athens filled over 1,100 of 1,200 offices by lot among about 21,000 male citizens and bound the rich to liturgies. Dasgupta and Beard (2007) find some capture pro-poor, and Lafont (2015) faults sortition for lacking accountability.

Open the PDF 24 pages · 398 KB

Number
305
Letter code
CA-11
Book
GOVERNING after the FALL
Shelf
Capture, the dark triad and failure modes
File
305 CA-11 Money as the capture vector, lobbying, rents and elite capture at the village.pdf
Pages
24

Used in

The rows that check it

  • 22 open
  • 5 to check first
  • C06-08 open Check first Nearly all offices filled by lot from volunteers for one year (about 1,100 of 1,200). HI-01's source is a Wikipedia page (the flag "cited by chapter 7" was stale and was cleared …
  • C06-30 open Check first About thirty thousand adult male citizens in an Attica of about three hundred thousand people (Attica's population moved to the data page at the edit pass of 2026-10-23, prose …
  • C08-29 open Check first West Bengal from the 1990s reserved a third of village council headships for women
  • C09-25 open Check first About two in five retiring members of Congress have gone straight into lobbying (figure moved to the data page at the edit pass of 2026-10-23, prose now says "a large share", the …
  • C11-46 open Check first A Hutterite colony splits near about 150
  • C09-23 open An economist wrote in 1971 that regulation "is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit"
  • C09-24 open Later critics showed the capture theory too strong
  • C09-26 open Local government knows more and is easier to capture, because the poor depend on the local rich for work, credit and land
  • C09-27 open A review of World Bank community programmes worth billions found participation often cosmetic and elite capture common (figure moved to the data page at the edit pass of …
  • C09-28 open Indonesia: nearly six households in ten attended full community meetings, fewer than one in six where local leaders ran them
  • C09-29 open Formal office holders and relatives were a few points more likely to receive cash, health cover and subsidised rice than equally poor neighbours, informal elites slightly less …
  • C09-30 open The patient chair who schedules decisive meetings at harvest and fills the quorum with tenants, debtors and cousins
  • C09-31 open Athens made its richest pay publicly for warships and festivals, any man could challenge a richer neighbour to take the burden or swap estates, a speech from about 330 BC …
  • C09-34 open Money's capture is personal in village and district and runs through campaign money and rule drafting from the town up
  • C09-50 open Gossip stops reaching past about 150 people and a village splits into circles
  • C09-54 open Money and records are the two quiet doors
  • C09-61 open In parts of Indonesia elites seized development money and shared it fairly, for their standing
  • C09-63 open A village of 300 and a district of 3,000 need a chest, iron-gall ink, hazel, a calendar and three literate people
  • C09-68 open Post the accounts on the meeting-place wall in the village's own words
  • C09-69 open Relief decided by the whole village, at a time the poorest can come and never at harvest
  • C09-70 open Richest households carry the heaviest public burdens, and any household may challenge another claiming to be poorer
  • C09-71 open An outside check at a time nobody chose belongs to the district, with the evidence in chapter 12

In the Index

The village and its trades